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Practitioners dealing with union organizing in the vicinity of National
Labor Relations Board (Board) elections need more than a basic
understanding of the Board's cases covering elections. Thus, the case of
Nathan Katz Realty v. NLRB' is important, regardless of the jurisdiction in
which an election occurs, because all Board decisions may be appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
(D.C. Circuit). This Article provides an overview of the Board's
electioneering precedent, discusses the case of Nathan Katz, and then
suggests the manner by which the Board can harmonize its precedents
dealing with the presence of organizers in the election vicinity, as requested
by the D.C. Circuit in the Nathan Katz decision.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Board's Electioneering Rules
A few basic rules govern electioneering. Peerless Plywood Co.
2
prohibits mandatory election speeches to massed assemblies of employees
on company time within twenty-four hours of the election. Milchem, Inc.3
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1. Nathan Katz Realty v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
2. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1954). "[T]he combined circumstances
of (1) the use of company time for preelection speeches and (2) the delivery of such
speeches on the eve of the election tend to destroy freedom of choice and establish an
atmosphere in which a free election cannot be held." Id. at 429-30.
3. Milchem, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362 (1968).
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prohibits sustained conversation with prospective voters waiting to cast
their ballots, even where the topic of conversation is unrelated to the
voting.4 Ordinarily, however, electioneering will not fall within these rules,
and the Board will consider a number of factors to determine whether
electioneering interfered with the free choice of the voters. The Board
considers whether the conduct occurred at or near the polling place, the
extent and nature of the electioneering, whether it is conducted by a party
to the election or employees, and whether it is within a designated no-
electioneering area or contrary to the instructions of the Board agent.'
The Board set forth these factors in Boston Insulated Wire & Cable
Co.6  In Boston Insulated Wire, the election was conducted at the
employer's building in a ground floor room approximately ten feet up a
corridor from a set of glass-paneled doors opening to the parking lot. At
the opposite end of the corridor, a stairway led to the main entrance of the
building. Union agents passed out campaign leaflets and spoke to
employees as they entered both entrances. Additionally, as the line of
employees waiting to vote reached the closed glass-paneled doors, the
agents peered through the doors and continued to talk to and hand literature
to entering employees.
7
The Board noted that it "does not apply its 'no-electioneering' rules to
set aside elections whenever electioneering takes place 'at or near the
polls,' regardless of the circumstances. 8 The Board then discussed each of
the factors it normally relies upon to determine whether electioneering is
sufficient to interfere with an election. It stated,
[t]he Board considers not only whether the conduct occurred
within or near the polling place, but also the extent and nature of
the alleged electioneering, and whether it is conducted by a party
to the election or by employees. The Board has also relied on
whether the electioneering is conducted within a designated 'no-
electioneering' area or contrary to the instructions of the Board
agent.9
4. Id. at 362 ("[T]he standard here applied insures that no party gains a last minute
advantage over the other, and at the same time deprives neither party of any important
access to the ear of the voter."); see also Bio-Medical Applications of Puerto Rico, Inc., 269
N.L.R.B. 827, 829-30 (1984) (arguably extending the Milchem rule to prohibit sustained
conversation with prospective voters in the entire no-electioneering zone when one is
designated).
5. Boston Insulated Wire & Cable Co., 259 N.L.R.B. 1118, 1119 (1982).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1118.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1119 (footnotes omitted).
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As to the nature and extent of electioneering, the Board noted that even the
strict Milchem rule does not apply to a "chance, isolated, innocuous
comment or inquiry" between a party and a voter.'0 The Board also
discussed how it has long distinguished between the conduct of parties to
the election and that of employees, which must be more disruptive in order
to constitute objectionable conduct."
The Board held that the union agents' conduct was not objectionable.
2
It reasoned that the electioneering was conducted away from the polling
places, was not directed at employees waiting in line, was not in a
designated no-electioneering zone, and did not violate any instructions by
the Board agent. The Board further reasoned that the most significant
consideration was that the voters waiting in line were separated from the
electioneering by the closed glass-paneled doors. It concluded that once in
the building corridor, the voters were insulated from electioneering.'
3
Considering all the applicable factors, the Board has found that
electioneering was not objectionable in several additional cases. In Alson
Manufacturing,14 three employees' testimony was credited as follows. One
witness saw two union representatives standing in the parking lot outside
the warehouse approximately one hundred feet away from the voting booth
speaking with some other employees. The second witness testified that he
saw the remaining union representative talking to a group of employees
approximately one hundred feet away from the voting booth and that he
saw one of the employees in the group later vote. The third witness saw
the same union representative standing twenty-five feet from the voter
check-in table while the election was ongoing but voting had finished. He
did not see the representative speak to any employee."
The Board held that the union representative's conduct was not
objectionable.' 6 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reasoned that while
the conversation occurred near the polling area, the conduct was de minimis
in nature. The representative spoke with a group of employees, only one of
which had not voted. That vote could not have affected the outcome of the
election. The ALJ further reasoned that the representative's mere presence
approximately twenty-five feet from the voting booth after voting had been
completed could not affect the outcome of the election. 7
In Sterling Faucet Co. , i four employees were campaigning for a
10. Id. at 1119 n.10.
11. Id. at 1119 n.ll1.
12. Id. at 1119.
13. Id.
14. 230 N.L.R.B. 735, 740 (1977), enforced at 599 F.2d 1057 (9thCir. 1979).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 741.
17. Id.
18. Sterling Faucet Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 1031 (1973).
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union for approximately twenty minutes outside the cafeteria where the
election was held. The employees distributed union literature while
wearing union buttons and hats. Two employees stood by the time clock;
the third was approximately forty feet from the cafeteria door; and the
fourth was approximately six feet from the door. All stood in the main
aisle which the employees normally followed from the entrance, at the time
clock, to the cafeteria. 9 The Board held that the employees' electioneering
did not constitute objectionable conduct. The ALJ reasoned that the
electioneering did not occur in a no-electioneering area.20 Rather, the
nearest electioneerer stood approximately six feet from the door of the
cafeteria and could not be seen from within the polling place.2' The ALJ
further reasoned that at no time were any employees waiting in line outside
of the cafeteria to vote.22
In Harold W. Moore,23 the election was conducted at a warehouse. The
voting area was about thirty feet from the entrance to the warehouse. Three
union representatives stood in the parking lot outside the warehouse
approximately thirty feet from the entrance. They spoke with
approximately six to eight employees. The conversations lasted from ten to
fifteen minutes and occurred while the polls were open.24 The Board held
that the conversations, even if deemed to be electioneering, were not
objectionable. The Board reasoned that the electioneering was not
substantial and did not take place in a no-electioneering area. The Board
held that the electioneering was not so near the polls, under the
circumstances, as to be objectionable.25
The D.C. Circuit has also applied these factors to find electioneering
unobjectionable. In Overnite Transportation Co. v. NLRB,26 the union held
a "raucous" rally near the polling center.27  It was attended by an
international organizer, the international president, and the president of the
local union. Approximately one hundred employees gathered, held a
cookout, and dispensed free food and drink. The crowd constantly hooted,
hollered, and chanted slogans. Passing truckers honked their horns as they
drove by the gathering. The Board held there was no unlawful
electioneering.28
19. Id. at 1037.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1038.
22. Id.
23. Harold W. Moore, 173 N.L.R.B. 1258 (1968).
24. Id. at 1258.
25. Id.
26. Overnite Transportation Co. v. NLRB, 140 F.3d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
27. Id. at 269.
28. Id.
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The D.C. Circuit upheld the Board's decision.29 The D.C. Circuit
stated that
[t]he Board generally considers the nature and extent of the
electioneering, whether it happened within a designated 'no
electioneering' area, whether it was contrary to the instructions of
the Board's election agent, whether a party to the election
objected to it, and whether a party to the election engaged in it.30
The D.C. Circuit then applied the factors and found that the employer had
failed to demonstrate that there was a no-electioneering area, that any
instructions were issued by the Board agent, that any party had objected to
the union rally, or that the union was responsible for directing or
participating in any objectionable conduct.31
III. THE NATHAN KATz CASE
A. The Region's Decision
In Nathan Katz, the Regional Director dismissed an objection that the
union violated the designated no-electioneering area by stationing
representatives therein.32 The Regional Director assumed the facts, as
presented by the employer, were true and found there was insufficient
evidence to go to hearing on the objection.33
The assumed facts were the following: the polling place was at a
church, not a workplace, 34 and the Board agent established a no-
electioneering zone of twenty-five yards outside the entrance to the
church.35 Also, two union agents were parked in a car within twenty feet of
the church's door for one hour and forty minutes during the election.36
From this location, the union agents could easily watch the entrance to the
church.37 They motioned at one employee and honked at two others as the
two walked towards the church to vote.3
The Regional Director cited the Boston Insulated factors, stating that
29. Id. at 270.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Nathan Katz Realty, LLC, No. 29-RC-9265, slip op. at *10 (Sept. 8, 1999)
(hereinafter "Supplemental Decision").
33. Id.
34. Id. at *4.
35. Id. at *5.
36. Id. at *9.
37. Id.
38. Id. at *7.
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"[w]hen faced with evidence of impermissible electioneering, the Board
evaluates the probable impact of electioneering on the free choice of voters
by considering multiple factors., 39 The Regional Director proceeded to
apply the factors set forth in Boston Insulated to determine whether
electioneering interfered with the exercise of the employees' free choice.
The Regional Director first conceded that party representatives were
stationed in a no-electioneering zone for a portion of the polling period*
40
He proceeded to explain why, nevertheless, the other factors outweighed
those factors. First, the Regional Director found that the union agents did
not actually engage in any electioneering. Rather, they made several
innocuous gestures and the Regional Director reasoned that they merely
motioned to an employee and honked the horn at two others; there was no
evidence that the union agents spoke to any employees as they were on the
way to vote.4 ' Second, the Regional Director noted the considerable
distance of the agents from the actual voting place, "through a gate, a door
and a stairwell leading to the basement voting place. 4 2 Thus, the Regional
Director concluded that these two factors, whether the conduct was near the
polling place and the extent and nature of the activity, outweighed the other
two factors, party conduct within a no electioneering area. The Regional
Director found that "the [union's] conduct does not support a conclusion
that they engaged in objectionable conduct sufficient to set aside the
election, despite their presence in the broad no-electioneering zone." '43
The Regional Director attempted to distinguish two cases that held
objectionable a supervisor's presence in a place employees were required
to pass to get to the polling location, Electric Hose and Rubber Co.44 and
Performance Measurements Co.,41 on the basis that those cases involved
conduct inside the facilities.46  A brief synopsis of these two cases is
warranted, in order to fully understand the Nathan Katz decision.
In Electric Hose and Rubber Co., the Board found three instances of
objectionable surveillance by supervisors.47  One supervisor was
"stationed" within ten to fifteen feet of the entrance to the voting area. The
supervisor did not testify to explain his presence there. The employer
argued that the supervisor stood in a section of the plant where his usual
responsibilities were carried out. The ALJ reasoned that proximity to the
location of the supervisor's usual work area did not justify his presence
39. Id. at *8.




44. Electric Hose and Rubber Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 186 (1982).
45. Performance Measurements Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1657 (1964).
46. Supplemental Decision at *10 n.12.
47. Electric Hose, 262 N.L.R.B. at 216.
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during the voting. The ALJ further reasoned that, because the employer
did not provide a sufficient explanation for stationing the supervisor
outside the voting area, "it can only be concluded that his purpose in
observing the event was to effectively survey the union activities of the
employees and to convey to these employees the impression that they were
being watched., 48 The ALJ found the supervisor's conduct destroyed the
requisite laboratory conditions for a free and fair election. 49 Additionally,
in order to reach the voting area from their workstations, employees had to
pass an area in which either of two supervisors was standing. One of the
supervisors did not testify, and the other did not explain his presence in the
area. As in the case of the first supervisor, the ALJ held objectionable the
unexplained presence of these other supervisors at points where employees
had to pass in order to vote.5°
In Performance Measurements Co.,5' the election took place at two
plants. At each plant, the employer's president alternately stood near the
door employees used to enter the polling place or sat at a table
approximately six feet from the doorway. Part of this time, he was
instructing supervisors in regard to the release of employees from work for
voting purposes. The president also entered the first polling place and left
when the Board agent informed him that the polls were still open. He
additionally entered the second polling place as the ballot box was being
sealed.52 The Board held that "the continued presence of the Employer's
president at a location where employees were required to pass in order to
enter the polling place was improper conduct ... . It mentioned that the
acting regional director had found no evidence that the employer's
president engaged in electioneering. Nevertheless, the Board reasoned that
the president's continuous presence at or near the polling place was
inappropriate, even though part of that time was spent instructing the
supervisors. The Board held that such presence, without justification,
interfered with the employees' freedom of choice in the election.54
B. The D.C. Circuit's Decision
After Nathan Katz refused to bargain, the case ended up before the
D.C. Circuit. The D.C. Circuit relied on the facts as assumed by the








55. Nathan Katz Realty v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 981, 991 (2001).
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Katz's objection, but contrary to the facts relied upon by the Regional
Director.56 This crucial additional fact was that "'[a] voter approaching the
Church entrance on the sidewalk (the only means of access) would have to
walk within a few feet of the car."
57
The Court recognized the standard factors which apply to determine
whether electioneering is objectionable. The D.C. Circuit held that "(1) the
Union agents' conduct occurred in a no-electioneering zone; (2) their
presence and actions were contrary to the instructions of the Board Agent;
(3) Katz objected to the Union agent's conduct; and (4) the people who
engaged in the conduct were agents of a party to the election.58
The D.C. Circuit, however, did not base its decision on weighing all of
the factors, including the key factor-the nature and extent of the
electioneering. Rather, the D.C. Circuit turned to Electric Hose and
Performance Measurement to argue that "a party's mere presence may be
sufficient to justify setting aside an election."5 9 The Court explained that in
Electric Hose, the Board held objectionable the unexplained presence of
two supervisors in a place where employees had to pass in order to vote.6 °
The D.C. Circuit discussed that in Performance Measurement, the
company president standing by the door to the election area was found to
be improper conduct, despite the lack of a no-electioneering zone. 6' The
D.C. Circuit concluded that "[t]ogether, Electric Hose and Performance
Measurements seem to stand for the proposition that a party engages in
objectionable conduct sufficient to set aside an election if one of its agents
is continually present in a place where employees have to pass in order to
vote. 62 The D.C. Circuit remanded the case for the Board to hold further
proceedings and harmonize its precedent.63
C. The Remand and the ALJ's Decision
The Board interpreted the remand as "for further consideration of the
Respondent's arguments that.., the presence and actions of union agents
in the no-electioneering zone outside the election polling site interfered
56. Id. at 992-93. It is possible that Nathan Katz's offer of proof to the Regional
Director did not support this allegation, and this is the reason that the Regional Director
stated that "there is no evidence to suggest that employees were required to pass the
[union's] representatives in order to enter the building." Supplemental Decision at *10 n.12.
The decisions, however, are unclear as to the reason for the factual difference between the
Regional Director and the D.C. Circuit.
57. Id. at 992.
58. Id. at 991.
59. Id. at 992.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 993.
63. Id.
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with the employees' exercise of free choice in the election . '...,64 The
Board remanded to Region 29 for a hearing.65
A hearing was held and a decision issued by an ALJ.66 In dicta, the
ALJ disagreed with the statement of law as expressed by the D.C. Circuit,
i.e., that mere presence of a union agent is sufficient to set aside an
election.67 The ALJ reasoned that Milchem and its progeny are concerned
with electioneering, and there was no evidence of electioneering in this
case.
68
The ALJ further asserted that Performance Measurement and Electric
Hose were not based on presence of a party near the polls or on
electioneering. Rather, those cases held that supervisors were engaged in
objectionable surveillance because there was no other possible reason for
the supervisors' presence near the polling area.69 The ALJ then asserted, in
reliance on cases dealing with photographing employees, that different
standards are used to evaluate surveillance by unions than are used to
evaluate surveillance by employers. Presence by supervisors is deemed
coercive because an employer has virtually absolute control over
employees' terms and conditions of employment. In contrast, union
observation of employees is not necessarily coercive, and should not be so
presumed. 70 The ALJ found, in this case, that there was no evidence that
the union agents' conduct would have caused employees to fear reprisal.7'
After the hearing, the parties settled. Thus, the case never reached the
Board, and the decision of the ALJ cannot be relied upon as Board
precedent. The lack of a Board decision leaves untouched the holding of
the D.C. Circuit and the larger issue raised by Nathan Katz about whether
electioneering in a place employees have to pass is appropriate.
IV. SUBSEQUENT AUTHORITY ADDRESSING NATHAN KATZ
The only published decision to subsequently address the D.C.
Circuit's decision in Nathan Katz fails to resolve the issue of whether
presence at a place which employees must pass is objectionable
electioneering conduct.72  In U-Haul, the election took place at the
64. Order Remanding Proceeding to Regional Director for Further Hearing, Case 29-
CA-23280 *2 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 17, 2001).
65. Id. at *3.
66. Nathan Katz Realty, LLC, No. 29-CA-23280, 2002 NLRB LEXIS 367 (Aug. 12,
2002).
67. Id. at *35.
68. Id. at *37.
69. Id. at *39-40.
70. Id. at 40-41.
71. Id. at *43.
72. U-Haul Co. of Nevada, Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 26, No. 28-RC-6519, 2004 NLRB
20051
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employer's facility in an upstairs break room.73  A union representative
arrived in the parking lot of the facility after the election started and
remained there for thirty-five minutes. The Board held that the case was
distinguishable from Nathan Katz because the representative was not in a
location every eligible voter would have to pass in order to vote. The
Board found that "all but a handful of eligible voters" were already inside
the building by the time the representative arrived.74  The Board also
distinguished Nathan Katz because there was no evidence that the union
representative was in an established no-electioneering zone.75 The Board
further held that, although the representative "spoke to a handful of voters,"
the conduct did not violate Milchem.76 It reasoned, "these conversations
did not take place in the polling area, the waiting area, or near the line of
voters. Thus, they were not objectionable. 77
Thus, the Board indicated that it will not apply Nathan Katz when the
evidence fails to show that a union representative is present in a place that
many voters must pass.78 The case, however, fails to clarify whether
presence in such a location constitutes appropriate conduct.
V. HARMONIZING THE BOARD'S PRECEDENTS
It is unfortunate that the Board did not have the opportunity to
harmonize its precedents, in the Nathan Katz case, as directed. It could
have done so in the following manner.
In Nathan Katz, the D.C. Circuit confused a line of cases that deal
with surveillance as objectionable conduct, with the line of cases that
determines when electioneering is objectionable conduct. Employer
conduct that interferes with employees' protected section 7 rights to join or
refrain from joining a union violates section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor
Relations Act.79 Employer surveillance has long been held to be such an
LEXIS 55 (Feb. 9, 2004).
73. Id. at *9.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at *10.
77. Id. An unpublished decision of an ALJ in Berkshire Nursing Home also
distinguishes Nathan Katz. Berkshire Nursing Home LLC, No. 29-RC-101 13, 2004 NLRB
LEXIS 81 (Feb. 27, 2004). in this case, ten to twenty individuals, including union officials
were on the street in front of the facility, approaching or calling to employees arriving to
work. The ALJ distinguished Nathan Katz on the grounds that the representatives were
"clearly outside of any no-electioneering area." Id. at *9.
78. It further seems plausible to infer from U-Haul that the Board will not apply Nathan
Katz to cases where the union representative is present in an area not designated as within a
no-electioneering zone.
79. National Labor Relations Act, Sections 7 & 8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (2000).
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unfair labor practice. 80  This is because surveillance interferes with
employees' protected rights and tends to inhibit employees' future union
activities.8" Violations of section 8(a)(1) often amount to objectionable
election activity.82  In addition, conduct that does not independently
constitute an unfair labor practice can be found to constitute objectionable
activity.83  Electioneering is one such type of conduct. 4  The Board
prohibits electioneering at or near the polls in order to "safeguard its
electoral process from conduct which inhibits the free exercise of employee
choice."85
As recognized by the ALJ, Electric Hose and Performance
Measurement are not electioneering cases, they are surveillance cases.
Electric Hose is clearly a surveillance case on its face.86 The AL's holding
was based on the rationale that the supervisor's implicit purpose in
observing the voting was to let the employees know they were being
watched.87
Also, Performance Measurement has correctly been interpreted as a
surveillance case by the majority of cases to rely upon it. In Eagle-Picher
Industries, Inc., two supervisors briefly stood in the aisle leading to the
voting area while voting was ongoing.88 The union alleged in its objection
that the supervisors had engaged in improper electioneering. The ALI
found that this allegation was not supported by the evidence. The ALJ
further discussed how, by claiming that the supervisors' presence in the
aisle "would have made the employees feel 'under the glass' of the
employer,, 89 the union was actually claiming improper surveillance, not
improper electioneering. Moreover, the ALJ held, in reliance on
Performance Measurement, that the supervisors' conduct "could not have
given any employees the impression that their voting was under
surveillance." 90
The holding of Performance Measurement was applied to another
case, ITT Automotive,9' which featured extensive testimony regarding
alleged surveillance. Several employees testified that managers and a
supervisor were continuously standing in a circle in an area where
80. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT 162, (Patrick Hardin ed., 4th ed. 2001).
81. Id. at 163.
82. Id. at 93.
83. Id. at 445.
84. Id. at 465.
85. Boston Insulated Wire & Cable Co., 259 N.L.R.B. 1118, 1118 (1982).
86. Electric Hose and Rubber Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 186 (1982).
87. Id. at 216.
88. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 169, 185 (2000).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. ITT Automotive, 324 N.L.R.B. 609, 623 (1997).
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employees had to pass through to vote and where the managers and
supervisor could watch the employees waiting in line to vote. 2 Relying on
Performance Measurement, the ALJ found that the continued presence of
the managers and supervisor at a location employees were required to pass,
"from where they observed the employees while waiting.., outside the
door to the polling place" interfered with the election.93
In Blazes Broiler,94 a union agent sat in the employer restaurant in a
section open to the public, during the second voting session. He was
approximately twenty to thirty feet from the door to the banquet room
where the voting occurred. While sitting, his view of the entrance to the
banquet room was blocked by a five-foot wall. He only occasionally stood
up. Employees entering and leaving the corridor leading to the banquet
room passed within a few feet of the union agent.95 The employer argued,
in reliance on Performance Measurement, that the union agent's presence
was objectionable. The hearing officer interpreted Performance
Measurement as a "nonelectioneering case. 96 The hearing officer focused
on the alleged surveillance stating that Performance Measurement involves
"an Employer's President who stationed himself by the door to the voting
area where he could observe exactly who went in to vote."97 The hearing
officer distinguished Performance Measurement because, in the instant
case, the union agent had no direct view of the entrance to the banquet
room. The hearing officer held that although the union agent "could see
who entered the hallway leading to the banquet room... [h]e had no way
of knowing who was entering the hallway to vote.... ."98 Thus, the Board
held that the union agent's conduct was not objectionable.99
Member Hunter concurred, but suggested that he would overrule
Performance Measurement.'°  He disagreed with Performance
Measurement to the extent it "established a per se rule that the mere
presence of a party to an election outside the polling area constitutes
objectionable conduct.'' °. Instead, he recommended following Boston
Insulated Wire by examining the conduct of a party that stays outside the
polling area during an election under the totality of the circumstances. 2
Unfortunately, there have been other cases, besides Nathan Katz,
92. Id. at 623-24.
93. Id. at 625.
94. 274 N.L.R.B. 1031 (1985).




99. Id. at 1031-32.
100. Id. at 1031 n.3.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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where the courts and even the Board have treated Performance
Measurement as an electioneering, rather than a surveillance, case. For
instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
interpreted Performance Measurement to stand for the principle that "[i]t
might be possible to find that areas some distance from the polls should be
closed to campaigning because they had to be passed through in order to
vote." 103  The Board in Herb A. Cook interpreted Performance
Measurement to support the Milchem principle requiring that "interested
parties refrain from electioneering or even talking to employees in the
polling area waiting to vote. ' 4
If the Board is to harmonize its precedent, it must clarify the
distinction between electioneering and surveillance cases. Consistent with
precedent, it should find mere presence objectionable only when the sole
possible purpose of the presence is surveillance. Patrick Industries,'05 like
Blazes Broiler and Electric Hose and Rubber Company, makes clear that
presence is objectionable only when it is without a justification other than
observation of employees. 1°6 In Patrick Industries, two managers and a
supervisor were gathered "at a location within a few feet of the route taken
by most.., employees as they went to vote, thirty-five feet from the
[polling room], and seventy-two feet from the voting booth."'0 7  The
managers and supervisor stood there because a machine located there was
operating erratically. They remained there for at least twenty minutes,
discussing the machine, its production output, and also a broken air
compressor.'0° The Board held that the conduct was not objectionable.
The ALJ reasoned that "if the supervisors' purpose in standing near the
[machine] was to convey to the employees that they were being
watched... [the] objection might well be a valid one. ' °9 However, the
103. Robert's Tours, Inc. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 242, 244 (9th Cir. 1978). The conclusion
of law itself is not in error, because, in certain circumstances, weighing the Boston Insulated
factors may lead to the conclusion that campaigning in an area voters must pass is
objectionable. The difficulty is in interpreting Performance Measurement, in which there
was no evidence of campaigning by the company president, as supporting such a
conclusion.
104. Herb A. Cook, 182 NLRB 796, 810 (1970). This principle accurately reflects
Milchem. In Performance Measurement, however, there was no evidence of the company
president conversing with employees, and, thus, no support for such an interpretation of the
case.
105. Patrick Industries, 318 N.L.R.B. 245 (1995).
106. Blazes Broiler, 274 N.L.R.B. 1031 (1985) (holding that a union representative
seated in a restaurant approximately thirty feet from the entrance to the voting room was not
objectionable because he could not observe employees entering the voting room from his
vantage point); Electric Hose and Rubber Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 186, 216 (1982).
107. Patrick Industries, 318 N.L.R.B. at 256.
108. Id. at 256.
109. Id.
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ALJ concluded that the supervisors were at the location for work-related
reasons."1
0
The Board should follow the suggestion of Member Hunter in Blazes
Broiler,"' and explicitly overrule Performance Measurement to the extent
it appears to set forth a per se rule prohibiting presence in areas where
employees pass to get to the polls. Indeed, to the extent Performance
Measurement can be interpreted as an electioneering case, it has been
implicitly overruled. It is pre-Milchem, pre-Boston Insulated Wire, and has
been implicitly overruled to the extent it contradicts those cases. Milchem
intended to set forth a clear standard, which had not been enunciated in
prior decisions, for dealing with the effect of conversations between parties
to the election and employees preparing to vote.'1 2 And, Boston Insulated
Wire made absolutely clear that no per se rule governs electioneering;
rather, the Board considers a number of factors to find impermissible
electioneering.' 3
It makes little sense to have a rule stricter than Milchem's, which
applies to those standing in line to vote, applicable at a spot far removed
from the polling place. Yet, the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of Electric
Hose and Performance Measurement in Nathan Katz arguably leads to
exactly this result. Milchem prohibits only sustained conversation with
employees waiting to vote."4 Thus, if the D.C. Circuit's interpretation is
correct, a union agent can be present in the polling place and engage in
limited conversation with employees without objection; but, if she is
present outside the polling place in an area which employees pass to vote,
even with substantial justification, the conduct is objectionable.
VI. CONCLUSION
The D.C. Circuit has posited that mere presence of a union agent near
a polling place is objectionable conduct. In Nathan Katz, the D.C. Circuit
offered the Board the opportunity to harmonize conflicting precedent,
which arguably leads to this proposition. The Board was unfortunately
unable to do so. Now, the Board should take the first opportunity to clarify
that mere presence is objectionable only when the sole possible purpose of
the presence is surveillance. It should explicitly overrule all arguably
contrary precedent. Today, more than ever, the fairness of Board elections
110. Id.
111. 274 N.L.R.B. 1031, 1031 n.3 (1985).
112. Milchem, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362, 362 (1968).
113. Boston Insulated Wire, 259 N.L.R.B. 1118, 1118 (1982). This case followed Star
Expansion Industries, 170 N.L.R.B. 364 (1968), which was decided the same day as
Milchem and addressed electioneering outside, but in close proximity to, the polling place.
114. Milchem, 170 N.L.R.B. at 363.
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is being called into question; it is of utmost importance that the law
governing elections be predictable and just.
